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Abstract
We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially,
the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the
cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The
specic set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal
mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principals marginal surplus
function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems.
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important than that about the expected cost.
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Before undertaking new activities in uncertain environments, whether to be run for
public or private purposes, rms typically develop a feasibility analysis that is meant
to assess prospective costs. This analysis consists in determining not only the expected
cost, but also the variability of the cost around the expected value, which provides a
measure of the uncertainty associated with the activity.1 The outcome that is obtained
is not necessarily publicly observable. Therefore, when rms perform the analysis for a
delegated activity, they are likely to have an information advantage about the two assessed
cost components vis-à-vis the delegating party. Information problems of this kind may
plague any contractual relationship in which some good or service is procured from an
outside supplier under uncertainty about production costs. In particular, they are quite
relevant for government agencies (regulators, public authorities and other institutions)
dealing with rms (regulated monopolies, franchisees) for the execution of activities of
general interest. As an illustration, in transportation projects, entrusted rms present
forecasts that are generally overoptimistic. Not only this may reect the presence of
technical errors. It may also follow from the strategic manipulation of the truly estimated
expected cost and degree of uncertainty, unless incentives to behave opportunistically are
contractually removed.2
Although it is natural that, in uncertain environments, agents hold private information
about both the expected value of some parameter that matters in the relationship with
the principal and its variability, the literature has not yet studied how principals should
design screening mechanisms to properly address information issues of this kind. Riordan
and Sappington [15] and Spulber [17] focus on situations in which, at the outset of the
relationship with the principal, the agent is privately informed about the sole expected
cost of production. Miravete [14] - [13] and Courty and Li [8] take a similar approach,
though in a di¤erent context. They tackle the issue of private knowledge about the
expected consumption benet, looking at situations in which the agent is a consumer
who purchases a product from a monopolist. Courty and Li [8] also analyze the case in
which the consumer observes the variability of his perspective consumption benet but
not its expected value.
In this article, we characterize the optimal incentive mechanism for a production
activity that a principal requires from an agent who is privately informed about both
the expected cost and the variability of the cost at the contracting stage. In line with
previous works, we make the study truly positive by focusing on situations in which, at a
1A feasibility analysis can of course be required also to assess prospective benets. However, in this
study, we solely focus on costs.
2Several studies about transportation projects provide evidence that, in the latter, costs and errors
about expected costs turn out to be systematically bigger than originally estimated. It is argued that
wrong predictions are largely due to rmsstrategic behaviour (see, for instance, Flyvbjerg [10], Flyvb-
jerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter [11] and Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl [12]).
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later stage, the agent observes privately also the realized production cost, which can be
either low (the good state) or high (the bad state), i.e. we allow for sequential learning on
the agents side. Hence, overall, the agent holds two pieces of private information (jointly
representing the rst-stage two-dimensional type) at the outset of the relationship with
the principal and learns an additional piece of information once uncertainty vanishes.
By representing this information structure, we bridge the strand of literature on se-
quential learning problems (that we mentioned above) with the studies on simultaneous
multidimensional information issues. The latter explore situations in which, at the con-
tracting stage, the agent holds more than one piece of information related to either one
activity (Armstrong [1], Asker and Cantillon [4]) or two activities (Dana [9], Armstrong
and Rochet [2]). Nevertheless, the agent faces no uncertainty so that sequential learning
is ruled out in those models.
To pick the most suitable kind of mechanisms, among those that could be adopted
under the information structure of our interest, we take into account that the principal
prefers to collect a report every time the agent acquires some private information prior
to the policy choice, rather than to ignore it (for this argument, see Baron and Besanko
[5], for instance). In our framework, this means that, on the one hand, the initial report
should be two-dimensional, as in simultaneous multidimensional screening problems. On
the other hand, the agent should be required to disclose information twice: when the
relationship begins and after uncertainty vanishes. That is, screening should occur se-
quentially, as it is the case in Riordan and Sappington [15] and Courty and Li [8]. In
line with these requirements, we focus on a mechanism whereby a prior menu of optional
schedules, among which the agent chooses by reporting the rst-stage two-dimensional
type, is followed by a menu of specic contractual options, from which the agent draws
the nal policy by reporting the second-stage realization of the cost. In principle, while
the sequential nature of information release should inhibit the agents ability to behave
opportunistically, the two-dimensional nature of the agents initial information, together
with the fact that it concerns a single activity, should restrict the principals ability to
screen.3 How the optimal screening mechanism looks like in the framework of our interest
is thus far from obvious.
To understand the main features of the optimal scheme, it is important to identify
the variables that drive the agents incentives to (mis)represent private information and
that, at the same time, constitute screening devices for the principal. With private infor-
mation concerning the cost, the production levels to be assigned in the good and in the
bad state are naturally used as second-stage screening devices. To induce truthtelling
about the state realization, the former production level must be at least as large as the
latter for each rst-stage type. Once this requirement is met, provided that the agent
3On this point, see also the discussion in Rochet and Stole [16], who review some of the papers recalled
in the text.
3
is unlimitedly liable, the principal can easily nd a payment scheme that addresses the
second-stage information issue whatever the rst-stage decisions. Yet it remains to ensure
that the production levels chosen in compliance with the second-stage requirement, are
rst-stage incentive-compatible as well. This is more easily done by referring, at the rst
stage, to two quantity-related variables/devices, namely the expected production and the
expected di¤erence between the good- and the bad-state production levels (which is non-
negative, given the second-stage requirement aforementioned). While the former would
be standard in any sequential screening problem with privately known expected costs, the
latter becomes relevant because of the information problem on the cost variability and is
thus specic to our framework. Under these circumstances, the usual trade-o¤ between
allocation e¢ ciency and extraction of information rents is expressed in expected terms
and is thus linked to the quantity-related variables a¤ecting the agents initial incentives.
Our results reveal that the solution to this trade-o¤ and, hence, the features of the op-
timal mechanism depend nely on the joint work of two elements. One element resides in
the characteristics of the principals preferences for the good produced by the agent. It is
specically represented by the curvature of the marginal surplus function. The other ele-
ment is given by the relative importance of the principals knowledge imperfection about
the two cost components. It is represented by the so-called "spread index", namely a
ratio having, at numerator, the spread between possible cost means and, at denominator,
the spread between possible cost variabilities.
Let us illustrate why these two elements matter jointly. Each rent unit that the prin-
cipal can save at the rst stage by distorting quantities at the second stage is associated
with a loss in the expected marginal surplus and in the expected di¤erence between the
marginal surpluses of those quantities in the two possible states. Therefore, the e¢ ciency
losses that the principal incurs by inducing distortions depend upon the curvature of the
marginal surplus function. On the other hand, the rent-extraction benets that the prin-
cipal obtains through the allocation distortions are related to which dimension of private
information is more costly to her. This occurs because, while both expected production
and expected di¤erence increase with the good-state production level, they move in op-
posite directions as the bad-state production level is varied. A raise in the latter induces
an increase in the rent that is given up to prevent cheating on cost expectation through
the increase in expected production; it triggers a decrease in the rent that is given up
to prevent cheating on cost variability through the decrease in the expected di¤erence.
The way the bad-state production is xed in the optimal mechanism, in addition to the
good-state production, captures the need to compromise these two contrasting e¤ects.
The rent-extraction benets are related to the magnitude of the spread index through
this channel.
Once the joint relevance of the two core elements is understood, one has the key to
interpret the general ndings of our analysis. They are described as follows. The agency
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cost that the principal bears is highest when her marginal surplus function is very convex
and when the spread index is very low. Intuitively, as the marginal surplus function
proceeds from a very concave to a very convex shape, the e¢ ciency losses that ensue
from distorting the good-state production levels becomes increasingly more important,
relative to those ensuing from distorting bad-state production levels, as the latter are
smaller. Moreover, having the spread index low means that the two rst-stage informa-
tion problems are both concerning for the principal. Under this circumstance, because
of the contrasting e¤ects triggered by variations in the bad-state production levels, it
is convenient to point to adjustments mainly in the good-state productions to contain
the overall rent. However, this strategy is costly to the principal on e¢ ciency ground,
especially with a very convex marginal surplus function, as we said. This di¢ culty is less-
ened when the spread index is large i.e., when the information problem about the cost
variability at the rst stage is relatively weak. Then, the principal can rely more deeply
on distortions in the bad-state production levels, thereby retaining more surplus from
the agent. Furthermore, private knowledge about cost variability being of little concern,
(distorted) productions are optimally di¤erentiated only with respect to the other infor-
mation dimension. That is, pooling is induced in the production levels that are designed
for di¤erent realizations of cost variability. Under this result, the optimal mechanism
displays similarities with those characterized in contexts with publicly observable cost
variability (Riordan and Sappington [15], Courty and Li [8]). The mechanism that we
pin down naturally collapses onto the latter in the limit case in which the information
problem about the cost variability disappears.
The reminder of the article is organized as follows. After reviewing the mainly related
literature hereafter, we present the basic analytical setup in Section 2. In Section 3, we
develop a few preliminary steps of analysis and describe the rst-best benchmark. We
characterize the optimal mechanism in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. Mathematical
details are mainly presented in an Appendix.
1.1 The relationship with the literature
In a early work on agency relationships with information evolution over time, Riordan
and Sappington [15] explore the problem of a regulator who auctions out a franchise
public-service contract to a rm that holds private information about the expected cost
at the tendering stage and privately observes the realized cost at a later stage.4 Still in an
4A few more recent studies extend the analysis of Riordan and Sappington [15] to environments in
which either the contract includes such additional factors as product quality (Che [7]; see also Che [6] for
an overview) or it accounts for various sources of information asymmetries (Armstrong and Sappington
[3]) or both (Asker and Cantillon [4]). However, these papers do not tackle problems related to information
learning on the agents side. The information structure they consider is tantamount to having perfectly
correlated rst- and second-stage information in the model of Riordan and Sappington [15] (on this point
compare footnote 5 in Che [7]).
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auction model, Spulber [17] assumes that, at the tendering stage, each participant knows
privately the possible levels of a cost overrun that he may incur at a later stage, whereas
the basic cost is commonly observed. This is tantamount to having the agent privately
informed about either the cost expectation or its variability, with perfect correlation
between the two. Hence, private information at the tendering stage is one-dimensional,
as in the model of Riordan and Sappington [15]. Miravete [14] - [13] and Courty and
Li [8] represent an information problem analogous to that of Riordan and Sappington
[15], in a di¤erent setting. Specically, they consider a monopolist selling a product to a
consumer who knows privately his expected benet from consumption at the initial stage
and observes privately his actual preference for the product at a later stage. Additionally,
Courty and Li [8] investigate the alternative situation in which the customer is initially
informed about his taste variability, rather than its expected value.5 None of these
authors considers the possibility that the agent hold two-dimensional private information
(including both the expectation and the variability of the relevant cost/benet) at the
time he signs the contract with the principal, whereas we do so with regards to the cost of
the agents activity. The focus on a sequential mechanism, which we share with Riordan
and Sappington [15] and Courty and Li [8], allows us to account for the principals wish
to receive a report every time the agent learns something privately, as we mentioned.
From this standpoint, we rather diverge from Spulber [17] and Miravete [14] - [13]. In
the former model, second-stage information disclosure is unfeasible because contracts are
not enforceable; in the latter, sequential screening is neglected as the goal is to compare
two mechanisms that are based on either rst- or second-stage information release only.
Among the studies on simultaneous multidimensional screening, Dana [9] and Arm-
strong and Rochet [2] assume that the agent executes two activities for the principal,
holding private information about the cost of either activity. In this setting, the produc-
tion level of each activity is used as a screening instrument for the corresponding piece
of private information. In Asker and Cantillon [4], the agent runs a single business and
knows privately both the operating and the xed cost. As the latter is not related to
the produced quantity, the principal has one sole screening device related to the produc-
tion level. Similarly, in Armstrong [1] the agent executes a single activity but because
his two pieces of information (namely, production cost and product demand) are both
related to the production level, the principal uses the (sole) product price to screen both.
In our model, as in Asker and Cantillon [4] and in Armstrong [1], the agent is devoted
to a single activity. Nonetheless, unlike in those papers, two quantity-related screening
devices, namely the expected production and the expected di¤erence between produc-
5In details, Courty and Li [8] consider two types of customers having a continuum of possible valuations
of the product and study the following two situations: (i) one type rst-order stochastically dominates
the other; (ii) one type faces greater valuation uncertainty than the other in the sense of mean-preserving
spread. The rst case corresponds to having private information about the sole cost expectation, the
second case to having private information about the sole cost variability.
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tion levels, come up to be available for the principal at the stage in which she faces the
two-dimensional information problem.
2 The basic setup
We consider the relationship between a principal (P) and an agent, both risk-neutral,
for the production of q units of some good at a payment t:6 The expected unit cost
of production  is drawn from the set fL; Hg with commonly known probabilities 
and 1   ; respectively. We denote  = H   L > 0: The true unit cost is realized
after the contract is signed and before production takes place. It can be either    
or  +  with equal probabilities. The former (low cost) represents the "good" state
resulting from a positive shock; the latter (high cost) represents the "bad" state resulting
from a negative shock.7 By attaching equal probabilities to these two events, we prevent
that the otherwise asymmetric distribution of high and low unit costs impose structure
on the optimal mechanism. The parameter  expressing the uncertainty about the cost
realization is drawn from the set fL; Hg with commonly known probabilities  and
1  ; respectively. Throughout the article, we refer to  as to the variability of the unit
cost. We also denote  = H   L > 0: We hereafter refer to the generic realization
of the two cost parameters as to i and j; with i; j 2 fL;Hg : To simplify the analysis,
we take L; H ; L and H to be such that  > : In words, we suppose that the
knowledge imperfection about the expected unit cost is more important than that about
the cost variability. This means that higher expected cost corresponds to higher true
cost, even when it is associated with higher variability and the good state is realized (i.e.,
H   H > L   L):
Information structure Before sitting at the contracting table, the agent observes
privately the expected unit cost i; i 2 fL;Hg ; as well as the cost variability j; j 2
fL;Hg : Hence, when the contract is drawn up, he enjoys a double information advantage.
We denote ij the agents type for any realized pair (i; j) and   fLL;LH;HL;HHg
the set of feasible types. Moreover, the agent acquires a new information advantage when
the state of nature is determined. Indeed, he learns privately whether the latter is i j
or i + j:
6As far as a public project or an activity of general interest is concerned, the agent can be viewed as
a contractor, a supplier, a regulated (possibly local) monopoly; the principal as a government agency, a
regulator etc.
7For instance, these shocks could reect variations in the price of some input that is used to produce
the good. Principals may be (and are typically) unable to observe the prices at which agents purchase
production inputs from their suppliers.
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Payo¤s under symmetric information The relationship between P and the agent
unfolds over two stages but there is no discounting. For each ij 2 ; we let (q
ij
; tij) and
(qij; tij) denote the allocations to be implemented at the second stage, respectively in
states i   j and i + j: Accordingly, the agents second-stage prots are given by
ij = tij   (i   j) qij (1)
ij = tij   (i + j) qij: (2)




(ij + ij): (3)
Production of q units of the good by the agent yields gross surplus S (q) to P. We take
the function S () to be three-time di¤erentiable (for technical reasons), with S 0 > 0 and
S 00 < 0; 8q 2 R+ (as usual). We further assume that lim
q!0
S 0 (q) is nite but su¢ ciently
large and lim
q!+1
S 0 (q) su¢ ciently small to ensure that an interior solution exists.8 Lastly,
to rule out mixed cases, we suppose that S 000 has constant sign 8q 2 R+: The rst-stage







)  tij] + [S(qij)  tij]
o
: (4)
2.1 The programme of the principal
The Revelation Principle applies. This justies restricting attention to mechanisms
that induce truthful reporting. The optimal mechanism is the solution to the following



















[ti0j0   (i + j) qi0j0 ] + [ti0j0   (i   j) qi0j0 ]
o
; 8ij; i0j0 2  (5)
ij  ij + 2jqij; 8ij 2  (6)
ij  ij   2jqij; 8ij 2  (7)
ij  0; 8ij 2 : (8)
The objective function in   mirrors Ps purpose to maximize the expected level of surplus
net of the payment to be made to the agent for the production of the good. The inequality
in (5) represents the set of rst-stage incentive constraints, which ensure that each type
8We assume nite limits, rather than the more standard Inada conditions, in order not to impose any
restrictions on the shape of the function S0 () ; which is going to be a crucial aspect in our analysis.
8
ij (weakly) prefers to report truthfully.9 The inequalities in (6) and (7) represent the
sets of second-stage incentive constraints in the good and in the bad state, respectively,
which warrant that each type correctly announces whether a positive or a negative shock
has occurred. Finally, (8) is the set of participation constraints under which each type is
guaranteed non-negative expected payo¤.
The problem   compares with the programmes presented in Riordan and Sappington
[15] and in Courty and Li [8]. Unlike in the former model, which stylizes an auction
setting, here the principal deals with only one agent since the very beginning of the
relationship. More importantly, unlike in either model, at the contracting stage the
agent holds two pieces of information. Hence, he is to be induced to announce them both
correctly.
As usual, for the agent to release information at the second stage (which occurs when
both (6) and (7) are satised), it is necessary that P sets q
ij
 qij: That is, the quantity
produced in the good state (i   j) is to be at least as large as the quantity produced
in the bad state (i + j).10 Throughout the analysis, we shall sometimes refer to qij as
the "high" production level and to qij as the "low" production level.
In addition to being second-stage incentive-compatible, the pair of quantities (q
ij
; qij)
must be such that the ij agent truthtells at the rst stage. To see under which conditions
this occurs, rst observe that the expected total cost of the ij agent reporting i0j0 is
written












respectively denote the expected production and the expected di¤erence between high
and low production levels that P commends when she receives the report i0j0: Using (9),
the set of rst-stage incentive constraints in (5) is re-expressed as
ij  i0j0 + ECij(qi0j0 ; ri0j0)  ECi0j0(qi0j0 ; ri0j0); 8ij; i0j0 2 : (10)
This formulation highlights that the agents incentives to (mis)represent information at
the rst stage can be related directly to the expected productions and to the expected
production di¤erences of the types he might want to mimic (qi0j0 and ri0j0); suggesting that
P will be based on this link to contrast opportunistic behaviour. From this perspective,
9Observe that, in  , rst-stage incentive constraints are written implicitly assuming that, at the
second stage, the agent does disclose whether a positive or a negative shock has a¤ected the unit cost,
given that P provides incentives to do so. In Appendix we prove formally that the incentive constraints
in (5) imply those whereby the agent expects to misrepresent information at the second stage (which are
thus omitted in  ):
10Compare Lemma 3.1 in Courty and Li [8]. See also the discussion in Rochet and Stole [16] about
the quantity condition that is found in Courty and Li [8].
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provided the second-stage condition q
ij
 qij is met for all ij 2 ; the programme  
displays a similarity with the static two-dimensional information problems in which two
quantity-related screening devices are at hand because the agent executes two distinct
activities for the principal (Dana [9] and Armstrong and Rochet [2]). Here, however, a
complication follows from the circumstance that q and r pertain to the same activity
and are thus interlinked, involving that the solution to   does not simply replicate the
solution that is found for those problems.
Timing To sum up, the game between P and the agent unfolds as follows. Prior to
sitting at the contracting table, the agent observes privately i and j: At the rst stage,
P o¤ers to the agent the truthful menu of optional contracts f(q
ij
; tij); (qij; tij)g; 8ij 2 :
The agent reports ij to P and the contract targeted to type ij is signed. Both parties
fully commit to this contract. At the second stage, the agent observes privately whether
a positive or a negative shock has a¤ected the cost (and so whether the realized state is
good (i   j) or bad (i + j)) and reports it to P. Accordingly, out of the stipulated
contract, either the allocation (q
ij
; tij) or the allocation (qij; tij) is e¤ected.
3 A few preliminary steps of analysis
As usual in full-commitment frameworks without limited liability on the agents side,
P has no di¢ culty at designing transfers tij and tij that are second-stage incentive-
compatible, for any given pair of production levels satisfying the required monotonicity
condition q
ij
 qij and for any given rent ij to be given up at the rst stage. Thus,
once it is ensured that q
ij
 qij; the analysis can be developed focusing on the rst-stage
information problem.
The four possible rst-stage types are "ordered" as follows:
LH  LL  HH  HL: (11)
This ranking reects increasing values of the expected total cost of production, which
we interpret as decreasing degrees of e¢ ciency in executing the activity. More precisely,
LH is the most e¢ cient type and HL the least e¢ cient type because, for any given pair
(qij; rij) ; the expected cost is lower the lower i and the higher j: Types LL and HH
both display an intermediate degree of e¢ ciency but type LL is more e¢ cient than type
HH because qij > rij (by denition) and  >  (by assumption).
To characterize the solution to  ; it is necessary to identify the constraints that are
potentially binding. Once the second-stage monotonicity condition is satised, the sole
relevant participation constraint is that of the least e¢ cient type (here type HL): This
is usually the case in sequential screening problems (compare Courty and Li [8]; see also
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Rochet and Stole [16]). It is also the case in simultaneous multidimensional screening
problems in contexts where the agent executes two activities (see Armstrong and Rochet
[2], for instance). Moreover, as it is typical of the latter category of problems, relevant
incentive constraints are some downward constraints whereby more e¢ cient types not
be willing to mimic some less e¢ cient type. In our setting, these are the incentive
constraints whereby type LH not be tempted to choose any other types contract, type
LL not be attracted by either the type HH or the type HL contract and type HH not
be interested in the type HL contract. Accordingly, the rents of the four possible types
are written as follows (see Appendix for details):
HL = 0 (12a)
HH = rHL (12b)
LL = max fLL;1; LL;2g (12c)
LH = max fLH;1; LH;2; LH;3g ; (12d)
where
LL;1 = qHL and LL;2 = rHL + qHH  rHH (13)
as well as
LH;1 = qHH +rHL; LH;2 = LL+rLL and LH;3 = qHL+rHL: (14)
The solution to   is di¤erently characterized, depending upon the specic values that
the payo¤s LL and LH take in (12a) to (12d). We shall enter into these details in a
moment, after describing the rst-best allocation, which P would e¤ect in a context of
complete information.
3.1 The rst-best allocation





) = i   j and S 0(qij) = i + j; respectively, where the star is appended to
indicate FB values. Moreover, he receives no rent i.e., ij = 0; 8ij 2 :
For future reference, it is useful to notice that, given the symmetry of the cost dis-
tribution, at FB, the expected marginal benet from the type ij production equals




) + S 0(qij)] = i;8ij 2 ; and is thus unrelated to
the second cost dimension. On the other hand, the expected di¤erence between mar-
ginal benets from high and low productions equals the variability of the unit cost i.e.,
1
2
[S 0(qij)  S 0(qij)] = j;8ij 2 ; and is thus unrelated to the rst cost dimension.
Recall that, under asymmetric information, the agents incentives to (mis)represent
the rst-stage type are directly linked to the expected production q and to the expected
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production di¤erence r:With regards to these expected quantities, it is further noteworthy
that FB levels are not necessarily ordered according to the typese¢ ciency ranking. To be
more precise, FB expected productions (qij) are not necessarily ordered according to the
e¢ ciency ranking in (11) ; despite that the expected cost increases with q (compare (9)).
In turn, FB expected di¤erences (rij) are not necessarily ranked in inverse order with
respect to (11) ; despite that the expected cost decreases with r (compare (9) again).
Actually, the way the FB values of q0s and r0s are ordered depends upon the shape
of the principals marginal surplus function. For instance, qLH  qHL if and only if
S 0 () is convex, whereas rHH  rLH if and only if S 0 () is concave. Remarkably, this
point delivers a preliminary hint about the optimal (second-best) mechanism. Under
asymmetric information, the distortions that the principal induces in the values of qij
and rij; through those in the values of qij and qij; depend nely on the characteristics
of the principals preferences, provided the associated e¢ ciency losses are strictly related
to the shape of the marginal surplus function. This aspect will become fully apparent
throughout the analysis below.
4 The second-best mechanism
We have previously mentioned that the second-best (SB hereafter) optimal mechanism
species di¤erently, according to the particular values that LL and LH take. In the
latter, two rent components are combined, namely q; which is given up to prevent that
the rst dimension of private information be overstated, and r; which is given up to
prevent that the second dimension be understated (see (13) and (14)).11
Based on the FB analysis we deduced that the SB values of qij and rij; 8ij 2 ;
are set according to the characteristics of the principals surplus function. Thus, rents
clearly depend on those characteristics as well. This is not the sole determining element
though. In addition, it matters how important the knowledge imperfection about the
expected unit cost () is, relative to that about the cost variability () : This rests
on the circumstance that any variation in the high-cost production level that the generic
rst-stage type ij is assigned at the second stage, triggers opposite e¤ects on the levels of
qij and rij and, hence, on the magnitude of the rent components qij and rij: As a
raise in the former comes along with a reduction in the latter (and vice versa), the optimal
allocation choice cannot abstract from considerations about how  compares with :
From now on, we shall conveniently use the ratio 

as a "spread index" capturing the
size of  relative to that of :
11The q0s and the r0s that we refer to are specically those included in the rents LL and LH : Type
subscripts are omitted for the sake of shortness.
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4.1 Characterization of the mechanism
In what follows, we present the SB mechanism moving from the case in which the
function S 0 () is very concave to that in which it is very convex, for diverse ranges of
values of the spread index. The superscript sb is used throughout to denote SB values,
when di¤erent from FB values.






: Further assume that S 0 () is "su¢ -






LL. The optimal mechanism is
characterized as follows:
 Rents are given by HL; sbHH ; sbLL;1 and sbLH;3:
 Quantities are such that qsbLH  qsbHL and rsbLH  rsbHL: i) If these two conditions
are strictly satised, then only the type HL productions are distorted away from






HL. Otherwise, the type LH













LH . Case (i) arises when S
0 () is not too concave as
well as when 








: Case (ii) arises when
S 0 () is very concave and 

< ; case (iii) when S 0 () is very concave and 

> :
The proposition describes the characteristics of the optimal mechanism when type LL
and type LH have both incentives to mimic type HL (so that the associated incentive
constraints are binding). Let us rst focus on type LL: Recall that this type is tempted
to report either HL or HH: The former case arises when, at SB, LL;1 > LL;2 i.e., when
(qsbHL   qsbHH)  (rsbHL   rsbHH): (15)
This condition is interpreted as follows. By over-reporting ; while truthtelling on ; type
LL would obtain a marginal gain equal to  (qHL   qHH) : At the same time, he would
renounce to the benet (rHL   rHH) i.e., to the prot designed for typeHH not being
tempted to mimic type HL; net of the loss that would be associated with over-reporting
: Overall, the LL agent would prefer to overstate only the rst information dimension
(i.e., to report HL) as long as the net benet associated with this lie is larger than that
he would obtain from overstating also the second dimension (i.e., from reporting HH):
Before moving to consider type LH; we nd it interesting to discuss the circumstances
under which it is optimal to concede the rent LL;1 to the LL agent (and thus (15)
holds). We previously mentioned that one relevant circumstance is the magnitude of the
spread index. To clarify this aspect with specic regards to the situations considered in
Proposition 1, it is useful to rewrite (15) as
( + ) (qsbHL   qsbHH)  (  ) (qsbHH   qsbHL): (16)
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; which is positive, should be low
enough as compared to the di¤erence qsbHL   qsbHH : The latter should then be positive as
well. However, this is not necessarily the case. The reason is that, as long as type LL
has an interest in mimicking type HL; raising the quantity that the latter is required
to produce if the bad state is realized, triggers two opposite e¤ects on the incentives to
declare HL at the rst stage. While the temptation to cheat on  is exacerbated (qHL
is increased), it becomes less attractive to cheat also on  (rHL is decreased). On
the other hand, requiring type HH to produce more in the bad state only tightens the
incentives to cheat on : The second e¤ect of a raise in qHL is more important the lower
 relative to : This explains why P sets qsbHL larger than q
sb
HH (so that (15) can be
satised) if and only if the spread index is su¢ ciently small (precisely, if and only if it
falls below the threshold 1 
+(1 )):
As we deduced from the FB analysis, another relevant circumstance resides in the
characteristics of Ps preferences for the good, which a¤ect the solution to   on e¢ ciency
ground. We shall now look more closely at this aspect with specic regards to the context
of Proposition 1. Recall that, as usual, the marginal surplus function is decreasing in
quantity. When it is concave, the rate of decrease of the marginal surplus is larger
the bigger the initial quantity. In the framework here considered, it means that, being
quantities such that at optimum q
HL
> qHH ; the benet that is additionally generated
reduces more by moving from q
HL
to some higher quantity than it does by moving from
qHH : This further involves that, as S
0 () becomes more concave, the wedge between the
production levels of these rst-stage types optimally decreases in either state, the rate of
decrease being higher in the good state. In other words, keeping the di¤erence qHL qHH




(hence, increasing the di¤erence qHL   qHH);
enables P to reach a higher surplus. This illustrates why, when S 0 () is su¢ ciently concave
(the situation considered in Proposition 1), P optimally designs a mechanism such that
(16) (or, equivalently, (15)) is satised.
We next consider type LH: Being most e¢ cient, this type might be willing to report
any of the other types. Looking at the rents listed in (12a) to (12d), one deduces that
type LH has incentives to mimic type HL; rather than either LL or HH; if and only
if qHL > qHH together with rHL > rLL: As the former inequality was discussed above,
to avoid redundancy, we now focus on the latter. At optimum, type LL produces more




) and, provided that 

> 1 
+(1 ) ; also in
the bad state (qsbLL > q
sb
HL): As before, for more concave S
0 () ; the di¤erence between low
production levels is kept large, at optimum, as compared to that between high production
levels. Thus, if S 0 () is su¢ ciently concave, then not only qHL > qHH but also rHL > rLL
and type LH is actually tempted to mimic the least e¢ cient type.
In denitive, Proposition 1 describes how the optimal mechanism is characterized in
situations in which all types are willing to declare HL: Accordingly, P distorts qHL and
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rHL downward in order to contain rents.
A particular case arises when the marginal surplus function is very concave. Recall
that, as S 0 () becomes more concave, for the concerned (rst-stage) types, P reduces the
wedge between production levels more in the good than in the bad state. If P were to
insist on the contract described so far when S 0 () is very concave, then the wedge between




+  and negative in the converse case) would




(which is positive), that either type LL or type HH would display unusual incentives
to pretend to be more e¢ cient. Specically, with qLH > qHL; type LL would obtain a
net benet equal to  (rHL   rLH) at the rst stage by mimicking the most e¢ cient
type rather than declaring HL: On the other hand, with qHL > qLH ; type HH would be
tempted to mimic type LH to obtain the net benet  (qHL   qLH) at the rst stage.
To remove the temptation to cheat, P optimally adjusts production levels at the second
stage so that rsbHL = r
sb





with qLH upward distorted, in the latter.12 This result is intriguing in that it describes
a situation in which P distorts quantities (also) for the most e¢ cient type to provide
desirable incentives to types that exhibit an intermediate degree of e¢ ciency.
Corollary 1 Assume 

 1 
+(1 ) : Further assume that S
0 () is su¢ ciently concave,
such that qsbHL > q
sb




LL: The optimal mechanism has the same charac-
teristics as described in Proposition 1 for the case of 

< ; except that sbLH;2 = 
sb
LH;3
and that the type LL production levels are such that rsbLL < rLL:
Recall that the magnitude of the spread index reects the importance of the infor-
mation problem about the expected unit cost relative to that about the cost variability.
The lower the index, the more costly it is to remove incentives to understate ; rela-
tive to removing incentives to overstate : In particular, when 

 1 
+(1 ) ; under the
mechanism described above, type LH would rather be attracted by the type LL con-
tract. To prevent cheating at the lowest cost, P now needs to concede the same rent
for the LH agent not reporting LL as she does for the LH agent not reporting HL
(i.e., sbLH;2 = 
sb
LH;3) and, unlike in the previous situation, to induce distortions in the
type LL production levels.
The next step of analysis is to consider situations in which S 0 () is less concave than
required in Proposition 1. To begin with, two particular cases can be identied, namely
that in which qsbHL = q
sb









with rsbHL = r
sb




LH;3; in the latter, as in Corollary 1,
sbLH;2 = 
sb
LH;3: Because these cases are explained similarly to Corollary 1, we do not
insist on them. We rather move to explore the more general situation in which the
12For instance, as compared to the situation previously described, P reduces the gap between the
production levels of type HL and raises that between those of type LH to warrant that rHL = rLH :
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concavity of the marginal surplus function is su¢ ciently weak that qsbHH > q
sb
HL jointly
with rsbLL > r
sb


























+ (1  ) 1

: Further assume that S 0 () is neither






HL; nor very convex, such that the
condition (15) holds together with
(qsbHH   qsbHL) = (rsbLL   rsbHL): (19)
The optimal mechanism is characterized as follows:
 rents are given by HL; sbHH ; sbLL;1 and sbLH;1 = sbLH;2;



















HL that we have already discussed, the additional condition (19)
holds at SB, meaning that type LH is assigned the same rent for not mimicking either
type HH or type LL (i.e., sbLH;1 = 
sb
LH;2). To contain the rent accruing to type LH;
which is lowest when (19) is satised, P distorts output away from the FB levels for types
HL; HH and LL: The rent would not be minimized if production levels were distorted
either for the sole types that could be announced by overstating  (namely, HL and HH)
or for the sole types that could be announced by understating  (namely, HL and LL):
To clarify this point, it is rst helpful to insist on the peculiarity of the trade-o¤
between e¢ ciency losses and rent-extraction benets in our framework. Here the basic
trade-o¤ involves second-stage allocations and rst-stage incentives. Specically, for each
feasible rst-stage type ij; at the second stage quantities are distorted away from FB levels




) + S 0(qij)]
against the rst-stage rents that depend upon the expected quantity qij and, on the other,




)   S 0(qij)]
against the rst-stage rents that depend upon rij:
We can now be based on this consideration to illustrate how the trade-o¤ is solved
in the situations considered in Proposition 2, taking into account the incentives to
(mis)represent information that an agent of type LH displays. Suppose rst that he
has no interest in declaring LL: Then, only the type HL and the type HH production
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levels are conveniently distorted. As from the previous explanation, q
HL
and qHL; and
thus qHL; are adjusted so that the resulting loss in expected surplus is traded o¤ against
the reduction in the rent qHL; which P concedes to prevent type LL from declaring
HL: Similarly, q
HH
and qHH ; and thus qHH ; are adjusted so that the resulting loss in
expected surplus is traded o¤ against the reduction in the rent qHH ; which type LH
receives for not announcing HH: This shows that, for all j 2 fL;Hg ; the distortions
induced in the type Hj production levels (and, implicitly, in qHj) serve the purpose of
removing the type Lj incentives to overstate  at lowest cost, which requires that, as at
FB, the expected marginal surplus be equal across Hj types i.e.,
S 0(qsb
HL
) + S 0(qsbHL) = S
0(qsb
HH
) + S 0(qsbHH): (20)
Next suppose that type LH has no incentive to report HH so that only the type HL
and the type LL production levels are distorted. Then, with analogous reasoning, for
all i 2 fL;Hg ; the distortions induced in the type iL quantities (and, implicitly, in riL)
serve the purpose of removing the type iH incentives to understate  at lowest cost,
which requires that, again as at FB, the expected di¤erence in marginal surplus be equal
across iL types i.e.,
S 0(qsbHL)  S 0(qsbHL) = S 0(qsbLL)  S 0(qsbLL): (21)
Using (20) and (21) ; one can clarify why P induces distortions for types HL; HH and
LL when the marginal surplus function is (close to) linear. If distortions were to concern
types HL and HH only, then it would be optimal to set production levels so that both
types provide the same output in expectation (qHH = qHL): However, in that case, the
rent designed for type LH would not remove his incentives to report LL; unless qHH
were raised above qHL: This would require that more important distortions be induced
for type HL than for type HH so that the e¢ ciency/rent-extraction trade-o¤ described
above would no longer be optimally solved. On the other hand, if distortions were to
concern types HL and LL only, then with S 0 () linear it would be optimal to set output
levels so that the di¤erence between high and low productions is the same for both types
in expectation (rLL = rHL): Yet, in that case, the rent designed for type LH would
not discourage the LH agent from mimicking type HH; unless rLL were increased above
(and thus distorted less than) rLH : Therefore, as long as ine¢ ciencies are induced for only
two types when S 0 () is linear, P is turned between two costly options, namely distorting
qHH less, relative to qHL; and distorting rLL less, relative to rHL: To contain the cost, P
seeks to decrease the type LH rent by keeping qHH and rLL as close as possible to qHL
and rHL; respectively. The least costly strategy is to design an equal rent that prevents
type LH from mimicking both type HH and type LL:
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As S 0 () becomes su¢ ciently convex, this strategy might no longer be appropriate.
Type LH may be tempted to report either HH or LL; rather than being indi¤erent
between the two lies, which removes the trade-o¤ between the candidate type LH rents.
However, it is not always clear which situation will actually arise, as the following corollary
states.
Corollary 2 Condition (19) is not necessarily satised for intermediary degrees of con-
vexity of S 0 () for which (15) holds. Suppose it is not, indeed. Then, LH;1 > LH;2
if and only if 

> 0; for some given 0 > 1: Moreover, LH;1 < LH;2 if and only if






: If there exists some degree of convexity of
S 0 () for which LH;1 > LH;2 is feasible, then LH;1 < LH;2 is feasible only for higher
degrees of convexity of S 0 () : The optimal mechanism has the same characteristics as in
Proposition 2 except that, whenever LH;1 > LH;2 (LH;1 < LH;2); type LH is assigned
the rent sbLH;1 (
sb
LH;2) and type LL (type HH) the FB production levels.
Keeping qHH and rLL close to qHL and rHL; respectively, might no longer be optimal
as S 0 () becomes more convex. To see why this is the case, notice that, in the good state,
typeHH and type LL are both more e¢ cient than is typeHL:13 Hence, production levels








; which shows that the optimal values of
the di¤erences qHH   qHL and rLL   rHL raise with the convexity of S 0 () : Remarkably,
if (19) is to be maintained, then the di¤erence rLL   rHL is to be enlarged more than
is to be the di¤erence qHH   qHL; for increasing degrees of convexity of S 0 () : However,
as S 0 () gets su¢ ciently convex, (19) no longer needs to hold at SB. For instance, we
might rather have (qsbHH   qsbHL) > (rsbLL   rsbHL). When this is the case, for some
convex S 0 () ; decreasing the wedge between the type HH and the type HL expected
productions is especially costly on e¢ ciency ground. Then, P prefers to leave a higher
rent to type LH for not mimicking type HH at the rst stage, rather than inducing
more important distortions in the type HH quantities at the second stage. For even
more convex S 0 () ; contrariwise, (qsbHH   qsbHL) < (rsbLL   rsbHL). This means that P
is now better o¤ conceding a larger rent to type LH for not announcing LL; rather than
inducing big distortions in the type LL production levels as to lower the wedge between
expected di¤erences.
Lastly observe that neither of the two possible situations in which one rent dominates
the other arises, unless type LL has incentives to mimic type HH; as it is the case when
(15) holds.
Proposition 3 Assume that S 0 () is su¢ ciently convex, in which case condition (15) is
not satised. The following two situations can arise:
13Indeed, H   H < H   L together with L   L < H   L:
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 If S 0 () is not very convex, then rsbHH > rsbLL: Assume  <  + 1  : The optimal
mechanism is characterized as follows:













 If S 0 () is very convex, then rsbHH  rsbLL: Assume  < 1 + 1  : The optimal
mechanism has the same characteristics as above, except that (i) the type LH rent





With S 0 () su¢ ciently convex, type LL could gain from cheating on both dimensions
of private information. To induce truthtelling, P is forced to concede a higher rent (now
sbLL;2) than in previous situations. With (15) not holding, it is straightforward to see
that the di¤erence between the type HH and the type HL expected quantities is now
to be set very large at optimum. As distorting quantities away from the FB levels at
the second stage is increasingly more costly, P abandons even more surplus to prevent
the type LL agent from reporting HH: Moreover, for S 0 () very convex, it is harder to
discourage type LH from mimicking type LL than type HH: This requires that a higher
rent be given up for not reporting LL; which calls for xing rsbLL  rsbHH :
In line with the content of Corollary 2, again it appears that, as S 0 () becomes more
convex, on the one hand, types LL and LH display increasingly stronger incentives to
pretend to be less e¢ cient and, on the other, it becomes more costly to distort quantities
for decreasing the rents that must be conceded to remove such incentives at the rst
stage.
In presenting our results so far, we have classied cases according to the curvature of
the principals marginal surplus function. This has helped us emphasize how the design of
the optimal mechanism varies with the principals preferences. Besides, we have suggested
that the structure of the incentive scheme also depends upon the magnitude of the spread
index, which reects the relative importance of the two rst-stage information problems
the principal tackles. The following corollary tells more on this latter aspect.
Corollary 3 Assume that 

is su¢ ciently large to violate any of the conditions stated
in Proposition 1 to 3 and in Corollary 2. The optimal mechanism is analogous to that













LL if and only if S
0 () is su¢ ciently concave. Under (ii);
if S 0 () is extremely concave, then rsbLH = rsbHH and the type LH production levels are
distorted such that rsbLH < r

LH :
This corollary states that, when the information problem about the expected unit
cost is relatively important (i.e.,  is su¢ ciently large with respect to ); the least
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costly way to remove the incentives of type LL to report either HL or HH is to pool the
production level designed for type HH with that designed for type HL in each possible
state.
To illustrate the content of the corollary, rst suppose that type LL is solely attracted
by the type HL contract. Then, in preventing that HH be announced untruthfully, P
is to be concerned with the rst dimension of private information only and so with the
magnitude of qHH : On the other hand, because not only type LL but also type HH
may be attracted by the type HL contract, when HL is reported P is to worry about
possible cheating on both information dimensions and thus about the magnitude of both
qHL and rHL: Taking this into account, P xes qsbHH > q
sb
HL
i.e., in the good state,
she preserves the FB ranking between the type HH and the type HL output levels.
By contrast, in the bad state, the FB ranking persists (i.e., qsbHL > q
sb
HH) if and only
if the spread index is su¢ ciently small because raising the type HL production has
opposite e¤ects on qHL and rHL; as already seen. This is the situation described
in Proposition 1 and 2 as well as in Corollary 1 and 2. Contrariwise, with 

su¢ ciently
large, it would be benecial to decrease qHL below qHH (i.e., to set qHH > qHL) to contain
the rent. However, by doing so, P would be unable to solicit information release from type
LL; independently of the characteristics of the marginal surplus function ((15) would be
violated). The best strategy for P is to make the type HH contract as attractive as the
type HL contract and set the type LL rent accordingly. This requires that for types




and qsbHL = q
sb
HH







Next suppose that type LL is solely tempted to reportHH; which is the case described
in Proposition 3. Then, when faced with the report HH; P is to worry about possible ling
on either dimension of private information. When faced with the report HL; instead, she
is to care about possible ling on  only. While the expected rent to be given up is larger
the biggerqHH ; rHH andrHL; here it does not depend uponqHL: This enables
P to raise the type HL production level in the bad state so that qsbHL > qsbHH : Although
both such quantities are lowered below the FB levels, the FB ranking is here preserved.
Indeed, a more important distortion is induced for type HH; provided the type HH
contract is appealing for both types LL and LH; whereas the type HL contract attracts
type HH only.
In denitive, the optimal balance between distortions depends upon how costly it is
for P to remove the incentives to lie on both dimensions of rst-stage information, relative
to removing the incentives to lie on one sole such dimension. From Proposition 3 we learn
that, as long as the spread index is low, the temptation to cheat on  is relatively more




: Corollary 3 highlights that the converse occurs
as the spread index becomes su¢ ciently large and type LL is attracted by the contract
designed for the least e¢ cient type. Then, as above, pooling the production levels of types
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HL and HH is the least costly strategy that P can adopt to discourage the LL agent
from reporting either such type.
Noticeably, the solution in Corollary 3 displays similarities with the optimal mecha-
nisms characterized in Riordan and Sappington [15] and in Courty and Li [8]. We found
that, in both possible states, production is xed at the FB level for a low-expected-cost
agent and distorted for a high-expected-cost agent, whatever the cost variability (the
 pooling result). In the models aforementioned, a similar no-distortion-at-the-top re-
sult emerges. For instance, in Riordan and Sappington [15], no distortion is associated
with the highest franchise valuation (i.e., the lowest expected production cost), whatever
the second-stage cost realization.14 The outcome in Corollary 3 exactly replicates those
of the authors aforementioned in the limit case in which  approaches zero. Actually,
in that case, our whole model degenerates into one in which the expected cost is privately
known to the agent, whereas the cost variability is publicly observable, just as in Riordan
and Sappington [15] and in Courty and Li [8].
5 Concluding remarks
We considered a principal-agent relationship in which the agent holds two pieces of
private information, namely expected value and variability of the unit production cost,
at the outset of the relationship with the principal and learns privately an additional
piece of information, namely the realized unit cost, at a later stage. This is the case in
a variety of real-world situations (frequently, in regulatory and procurements contexts)
in which the cost of performing the concerned activity is uncertain when the contractual
relationship begins and the activity is not executed until after uncertainty is solved. We
emphasized that, in these settings, the principal tackles an information problem that is
multidimensional and sequential at once and characterized the screening mechanism that
optimally trades o¤ rent-extraction against expected allocation e¢ ciency.
We found that contractual features depend nely on two elements that are di¤erent in
nature. One is given by the relative extent of the two rst-stage information imperfections,
as measured by the spread index, and thus pertains to the knowledge imprecision of the
principal about the production environment. The other is given by the shape of the
principals marginal surplus function and thus pertains to an intrinsic attribute of the
principal i.e., her preferences for the good.
The screening problem that the principal tackles is especially complex when the spread
index is low, in which case rst-stage cheating is potentially attractive for the agent on
either dimension of private information. Because of this, the problem displays similarities
with such simultaneous two-dimensional screening problems as that analyzed by Arm-
14Compare Corollary 3 in Riordan and Sappington [15].
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strong and Rochet [2]. Specically, at the rst stage, the principal faces an equally rich
set of incentive constraints (provided information is indeed disclosed at the second stage)
and has two quantity-related screening devices at hand. However, availability of two
such devices does not follow from having the agent execute two distinct activities, as it
is the case in Armstrong and Rochet [2]. Rather, it rests on the circumstance that those
devices depend strictly upon the two nal production levels, which must comply with
a second-stage incentive-compatibility requirement. This casts more restrictions on the
principals strategies so that more combinations of incentive constraints can be binding
in our framework. Actually, the rst-stage constraints that are binding in our model can
be viewed as the counterpart of those in Armstrong and Rochet [2] limitedly to the situ-
ations in which the marginal surplus function is not too convex (described in Proposition
1 and 2 and in Corollary 1 and 2). A di¤erent subset of constraints comes to matter when
the function becomes very convex (Proposition 3), in which case an agent forecasting low
mean and low variability of the cost must obtain more surplus for correctly announcing
either dimension of private information.
The problem that the principal tackles comes closer to a standard sequential screening
problem as the spread index becomes su¢ ciently large, meaning that the information
issue about the cost variability gets su¢ ciently weak in relative terms. Actually, under
these circumstances, the main preoccupation of the principal is to prevent rst-stage
cheating on the expected cost. It looks thus natural that the optimal mechanism displays
similarities with the ones characterized by Riordan and Sappington [15] and Courty and
Li [8] with regards to contexts where the agent holds one sole piece of private knowledge
at the beginning of the contractual relationship. Nevertheless, the sole case in which the
mechanism that we characterized would replicate those in previous sequential screening
models, is the limit case in which the principals imperfection about the second piece of
rst-stage information were to vanish. Noticeably, this is also the sole situation in which,
like in those models, the curvature of the marginal surplus function would have no impact
on the specic combination of binding rst-stage incentive constraints. This points to
the conclusion that the principals preferences come to play a role in shaping the optimal
mechanism precisely due to the multidimensional nature of the information problem that
is nested at the rst stage of the sequential screening procedure.
Two last points are worth making. First, in several studies about simultaneous multi-
dimensional screening, it emerges that the degree of correlation between di¤erent pieces
of private information a¤ects the design of the optimal mechanism. In our model, we
assumed away any correlation between expected cost and cost variability. This approach
helped us disentangle the e¤ects of the multidimensional nature of private information
in the sequential setting we considered. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, Courty
and Li [8] suggest through an example that, in situations where an agent forecasting low
(high) cost faces high (low) cost variability, there could be a gain in switching from a
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deterministic to a random mechanism. In our work, we only focused on deterministic
mechanisms as a rst step in the study of contract design in the novel framework that
we considered. Exploring random mechanisms would be a natural continuation of this
study.
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A Incentive constraints
A.1 Incentive constraints omitted in (5)
Assume that, at the rst stage, type ij reports i0j0: Conditional on this report, his
second-stage incentive constraints are written
ei0j0  ei0j0 + 2jqi0j0 (22)ei0j0  ei0j0   2jqi0j0 ; (23)
ei0j0 and ei0j0 being the corresponding prots in the good and bad state, respectively.




[ti0j0   (i + j) qi0j0 ] + [ti0j0   (i   j) qi0j0 ]
o
:
Type ij might want to declare i0j0 at the rst stage, anticipating that, at the second
stage, the following three alternatives will be available (apart from truthtelling whatever
the realization of the shock): (1) report a positive shock, whatever the realization; (2)
report a negative shock, whatever the realization; (3) report a positive (negative) shock
when the true shock is negative (positive). Accordingly, the three rst-stage incentive
constraints are written as follows:
ij  X + 1
2
(ei0j0   ei0j0   2jqi0j0)
ij  X + 1
2
(ei0j0 + 2jqi0j0   ei0j0)
ij  X + 1
2
(ei0j0   ei0j0   2jqi0j0) + 12(ei0j0 + 2jqi0j0   ei0j0)
These constraints are all implied by (5), (22) and (23).
A.2 Incentive constraints and rents
Using the denitions of qij and rij in the text, (3) is rewritten as ij = 12(tij + tij) 
(iqij   jrij): Based on this expression, we can reformulate the incentive constraints in
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(5) for all possible types as follows:
LL  HL + qHL (IC1)
LL  LH  rLH (IC2)
LL  HH + qHH  rHH (IC3)
HL  LL  qLL (IC4)
HL  HH  rHH (IC5)
HL  LH  qLH  rLH (IC6)
LH  HH + qHH (IC7)
LH  LL + rLL (IC8)
LH  HL + qHL + rHL (IC9)
HH  LH  qLH (IC10)
HH  HL + rHL (IC11)
HH  LL  qLL + rLL: (IC12)
Downward incentive constraints are (IC1), (IC3), (IC7) to (IC9) and (IC11). Assuming
that all other incentive constraints are slack and that HL = 0; we obtain the rents in
(12a) to (12d). With the latter, the participation constraints in (8) are trivially satised
for all types but HL:
B Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by solving the reduced problem  0; to be presented below. We subsequently
nd the conditions under which qHL > qHH and rHL > rLL. We then identify the
situations in which, under the assumptions of the proposition, the solution to  0 satises
all constraints in the general problem   as well as the exceptional case in which the
solution to  0 does not solve  : We lastly identify the distortions at the solution.
B.1 The reduced problem  0
Let  0 denote the reduced problem in which binding rst-stage incentive constraints
are those leading to the rents (12a), (12b), LL;1 in (12c) and (12d). We rewrite (12d) as
LH = 1 (qHH + rHL) + 2 (qHL + rLL) + 3 (qHL + rHL) ; (24)
with 0  k  1; k = 1; 2; 3; and 1 + 2 + 3 = 1: Embodying the rents above, the
objective function becomesX
ij2
Eij[Vij]  LL;1   (1  ) (1  )HH   (1  )LH :
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Optimizing with respect to quantities yields q
LH
and qLH for type LH; together with
S 0(q
HL
) = H   L + 
1  





1   +  (1 + 3)
1   
S 0 (qHL) = H + L +

1  
+ (1  ) (2 + 3)

   1  














for type LL and
S 0(q
HH
) = H   H + 1

1  
S 0 (qHH) = H + H + 1

1  
for type HH: Both in the quantity solution here above and throughout the rest of the
proof, the superscript sb is omitted.
B.2 The conditions under which qHL > qHH and rHL > rLL
Using (24) ; conditions qHL > qHH and rHL > rLL are found to be jointly equivalent










)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qHL)] = 2

(1  );
from which we deduce that qHL  qHH > qHH   qHL (or, equivalently, qHL > qHH) if and













)]  [S 0 (qHL)  S 0 (qLL)] = 2
1  
(1  );
from which we deduce that qLL   qHL > qLL   qHL (or, equivalently, rHL > rLL) if and
only if S 0 () is su¢ ciently concave.
B.3 Check incentive constraints in  
(IC1) is binding and (IC3) is slack because (15) is satised (as proved in the main
text). (IC2) is equivalent to rLH  rHL: (IC4) is equivalent to qLL  qHL; (IC5) to
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rHH  rHL; (IC6) to qLH + rLH  qHL + rHL; (IC7) to qHL  qHH ; (IC8)
to rHL  rLL; (IC10) to qLH  qHL and (IC12) to qLL + rHL  qHL + rLL:
(IC2) and (IC10) imply (IC6). (IC4) and (IC8) imply (IC1). Moreover, (IC7) and (IC8)
hold because qHL > qHH and rHL > rLL:













)]  [S 0(qHL)  S 0(qLH)] = 2[1 +
1  
 (1  ) ];
from which we deduce that (IC2) holds if and only if S 0 () is not very concave. Moreover,
from the solution to  0; rLH  rLL: Hence, if S 0 () is su¢ ciently concave for the condition
rHL  rLL (as stated in the proposition) to hold, then it is not necessarily the case that
rLH  rHL: Suppose  < 1 +(1 ) and so qLH < qHL. Then, rLH > rHL whatever the
shape of S 0 () :





qLL > qHL; the latter because both qHH > qHL and qHL > qHH :


























> qHL   qLH so that (IC10) is satised if and only if S 0 () is
not too concave. Moreover, qLH > qHH as we assumed that 3 = 1:
Hence, there exist some intermediary degrees of concavity of S 0 () for which both
qHL  qHH and qLH  qHL at the solution to  0. When S 0 () is very concave, only the
condition qHL  qHH is satised.





0 () very concave such that, as from the previous proof, the
solution to  0 violates (IC10): Thus, (IC10) is binding at the solution. (IC11) might be
slack instead. The best guess is that the binding constraints are the same as in  0; except
for (IC10) and (IC11).
Check (IC11). It is rewritten as qHL  qLH : Suppose it is slack. Then, the agents
expected rent is given by
[ + (1  ) (1  )] qHL + (1  ) rHL   (1  ) (1  ) qLH :
Embodying this expression into Ps objective function and calculating the rst-order





and qLH > qHL so that qLH > qHL: This contradicts the assumption that
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0 () very concave, such that the solution to  0 violates
(IC2). Take (IC2) to be binding. The best guess is that the other binding constraints
are the same as before with the sole possible exception of (IC1). This is equivalent to
rHL  rLH and might be slack. Taking (IC1) to be slack, the quantity solution leads
again to a contradiction. Hence, rHL = rLH :
B.4 Distortions
Take S 0 () to be not very concave, such that both rLH > rHL and qLH > qHL: At the




LH together with the quantity distortions
stated in the proposition. Next take S 0 () to be very concave and qHL = qLH : Under
this equality constraint, we have qLH < qLH : Lastly take S
0 () to be very concave and
rHL = rLH : Under this equality constraint, we have rLH < rLH .
C Proof of Corollary 1




+(1 ) and given the proof of Proposition 1, we have
qLL  qHL: Because qLL > qHL; we also have rLL > rHL; which contradicts the hypothesis
that 3 = 1: Recall the assumption that qHL > qHH , meaning that 1 = 0. Hence, if
3 = 0 then 2 = 1. However, the proof of Proposition 3 below shows that, with S
0 ()
concave, 2 6= 1: Hence, 0 < 3 < 1 and 0 < 2 < 1, in which case sbLH;2 = sbLH;3. The
condition rLL < rLL is found from the quantity solution to  
0 with 1 = 0.











)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qHL)] = 2

(1  ) (2 + 3) ;
from which we deduce that qHL > qHH if and only if S 0 () is su¢ ciently concave.
D Proof of Proposition 2
We learnt that qHH  qHL together with rLL  rHL as long as S 0 () is not very
concave (recall the proof of Proposition 1). This means that, in that case, 3 < 1: As
the concavity of S 0 () becomes less pronounced, the two conditions come to hold as strict
inequalities so that 3 = 0. Moreover, in the proof of Proposition 3 below we show that
neither 1 = 1 nor 2 = 1 unless S
0 () is su¢ ciently convex. Hence, because 1 > 0 and
2 > 0; (19) holds. In what follows, we rst nd the values of 1 and 2 and then check
that the remaining incentive constraints in   are satised.
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D.1 The values of 1 and 2





























Replacing 2 = 1   1 into the rst equation and 1 = 1   2 into the second, we nd
the expressions in (17) and (18).
D.2 Check incentive constraints in  
(IC1) and (IC3) are satised (as before). (IC4) is rewritten as qLL  qHL; (IC5) as
rHH  rHL and (IC12) as qLL + rHL  qHL + rLL. (IC7) and (IC8) are here
binding. Using (IC8) in (IC2), the latter becomes rLH  rLL. Using (IC8) in (IC6),
the latter becomes qLH + rLH  qHL + rLL: Using (IC7) in (IC9), the latter
becomes qHH  qHL and thus holds. Using (IC7) in (IC10), the latter is rewritten as
qLH  qHH : Combining (19) with (IC4), we see that (IC12) is satised. Using (IC9),















+ (1  ) 1

, qHL > qHH so that
rHH  rHL: Thus, (IC5) is satised. Also, both qLH > qHH and qLH > qHH so that
qLH  qHH and (IC10) is satised.
Check (IC4). We have qLL > qHH and, as from the proof hereafter, qLL > qHH . It









: Start from a situation in which 0 < 1 < 1 and 0 < 2 < 1 i.e.,
(19) is satised. Assume that S 0 () becomes more convex. If S 0(q
ij
) and S 0(qij) remain
unchanged for types HL; LL and HH; then the di¤erences qHH   qHL and rLL   rHL
increase to qHH qHL+q and to rLL rHL+r; respectively. To have (19) still satised,
S 0(q
ij
) and S 0(qij) should be changed so that q = r: Because  > ; this





15For the sake of clarity, we describe how S0(q
ij
) and S0(qij) change. First suppose thatq > r
prior to any change. Then, it is necessary that q be decreased and/or r increased for the equality to




)]   [S0 (qHH)  S0 (qHL)]




)]   [S0 (qHL)  S0 (qLL)] : As from (17) and (18) ;
it means that 2 is decreased and 1 increased. Changes are to be made in the opposite direction if
q < r; instead.
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E Proof of Corollary 2
We rst show that, for S 0 () su¢ ciently convex but (15) satised, the solution might
be such that either 1 = 1 or 2 = 1. We nd the conditions under which 1 = 1 and
those under which 2 = 1. In either case, we characterize the solution to  
0 and show
that it satises the constraints of problem  . We lastly compare the conditions under
which the two cases are respectively feasible.
E.1 The conditions under which 1 = 1
Take (15) to hold. The necessary conditions under which 1 = 1 are qHH > qHL and
 (qHH   qHL) >  (rLL   rHL) : (25)





)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qHL)] = 0: (26)
Thus, qHH > qHL if and only if S 0 () is strictly convex and qHH = qHL with S 0 () linear.
Check rLL > rHL: From the solution to  0; we have qLL > qHL. Take qLL < qHL.





)]  [S 0 (qHL)  S 0 (qLL)] = 2
1  
(1  ): (27)
In this case, rLL > rHL as long as S 0 () is not too concave.
Putting together the conditions for qHH > qHL with those for rLL > rHL; we deduce
that (25) is feasible only if S 0 () is strictly convex. Moreover, from (26) and (27) ; we
deduce that the di¤erence qHH   qHL is independent of both  and ; whereas the
di¤erence rLL   rHL is independent of  and positively related to . Therefore, for
some given degree of convexity of S 0 () for which (15) is satised, 1 = 1 if and only
if 

is su¢ ciently large. Lastly, (25) and (15) hold jointly only if rHH > rLL: Using





)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qLL)] =  2;
which means that rHH  rLL if and only if S 0 () is not very convex. In conclusion, having
both 1 = 1 and (15) satised is feasible for some S
0 () convex but not too convex and,
at the same time, 

su¢ ciently large.
E.1.1 Check incentive constraints in  
(IC1) and (IC3) are satised (as before). With 1 = 1 in  
0; (IC2) is equivalent
to qHL + rLH  qHH + rHL; (IC4) to qLL  qHL; (IC5) to rHH  rHL;
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(IC6) to qLH + rLH  qHH + rHL; (IC10) to qLH  qHH and (IC12) to






) = S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qLH)
so that rLH > rHH because S 0 () is convex. Together with (IC3), which is equivalent to





)]  [S 0 (qLL)  S 0 (qHL)] =
2
1  :
This says that qLL  qHL for S 0 () convex, in which case (IC4) is satised. From (26),










and qLL > qHH so that qLL > qHH . Together with (25) ; this implies
that (IC12) is satised.
E.2 The conditions under which 2 = 1
Take again (15) to hold. The conditions under which 2 = 1 are rLL > rHL and
 (rLL   rHL) >  (qHH   qHL) : (28)





) = S 0 (qHL)  S 0 (qLL)
so that rLL > rHL if and only if S 0 () is strictly convex and rLL = rHL with S 0 () linear.
Check qHH qHL:We have qHH > qHL and, with  < 1  (as stated in the corollary),





)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qHL)] = 2

(1  );
from which we deduce that qHH > qHL as long as S 0 () is not very concave.
Putting together the circumstances under which rLL > rHL and those under which
qHH > qHL; we notice that (28) is satised only if S 0 () is convex. Moreover, as S 0 ()
becomes more convex, (28) is satised only if rLL   rHL increases faster, as compared to






























: For any value of 

within this interval, there exists a
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threshold on the convexity of S 0 () above which (28) is satised. Lastly, (28) holds jointly
with (15) only if rLL > rHH ; which is the case if and only if S 0 () is su¢ ciently convex.
E.2.1 Check incentive constraints in  
(IC1) and (IC3) are satised (as before). With 2 = 1 in  
0; (IC2) is equivalent to
rLH  rLL; (IC4) to qLL  qHL; (IC5) to rHH  rHL; (IC6) toqLH+rLH  qHL+
rLL; (IC10) to qLH + rHL  qHL + rLL and (IC12) to qLL + rHL 





) = S 0(qLH)  S 0(qLL);
from which qLH > qLL. Together with (IC12), it implies that (IC10) is satised.




and qLL > qLH so that
rLH > rLL: Hence, (IC2) is satised. We further have qLL > qHL and qLL > qHL so that








; qHL > qHH so
that (IC5) is satised as well. (IC12) is equivalent to
( + ) (qLL   qHL) + (  ) (qLL   qHL)  0;




together with qLL > qHL:
E.3 Compare the conditions for 1 = 1 with those for 2 = 1
We found that 1 = 1 (and so 2 = 0) for some (not too high) degree of convexity of
S 0 () ; such that rHH > rLL; and for  su¢ ciently large. Suppose these conditions are
met and x the maximum degree of convexity of S 0 () for which rHH > rLL with 1 = 1:
Further suppose that, for some degree of convexity of S 0 () ; 2 = 1: We found that, for




. Recall also that qLL > qHH at the









This shows that the condition rLL > rHH that we found to be necessary for 2 = 1; is
tightened as 2 increases. Therefore, moving from the maximum degree of convexity of
S 0 () for which rHH > rLL with 1 = 1 (and 2 = 0) to some degree of convexity of S 0 ()
for which 2 = 1; it must be the case that the latter degree of convexity is higher.
F Proof of Proposition 3
Assume S 0 () is su¢ ciently convex that (15) is not satised at the solution to  0; in
which case the previous solution does not satisfy the constraints in  : In this case, (IC3)
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is more stringent than (IC1) and is thus binding. We rst present the reduced problem,
to be denoted  00; in which (IC3) is binding. We then present the solution and show
that, under the assumptions of the proposition, the conditions under which (IC3) implies
(IC1) is satised. We further analyze the solution and distinguish two cases, according
to whether rHH > rLL or rHH  rLL. We lastly show that, in either case, the solution to
 00 satises the constraints in  .
F.1 The reduced problem  00
Let  00 denote the reduced problem in which (IC3) is binding and the remaining
binding constraints are still those leading to the rents (12a), (12b) and (12d). Under
these circumstances, LL = qHH + rHL  rHH and
LH = 1 (qHH + rHL) + 2 (qHH + rHL + rLL  rHH)
+3 (qHL + rHL) ;
with 0  k  1; k = 1; 2; 3; and 1 + 2 + 3 = 1: Reformulating the objective function
in   to embody the above rents, we can write the rst-order conditions with respect to
quantities. We obtain q
LH
and qLH together with
S 0(q
LL
) = L   L + 1  

2







) = H   L +  (1  )3 + [1  (1  )] 
(1  )
S 0 (qHL) = H + L +
 (1  )3   [1  (1  )] 
(1  ) ;
for type HL; and
S 0(q
HH
) = H   H +  f[+ (1  ) (1 + 2)]    [+ (1  )2] g
(1  ) (1  )
S 0 (qHH) = H + H +
 f[+ (1  ) (1 + 2)]  + [+ (1  )2] g
(1  ) (1  ) ;
for type HH.
F.1.1 Show that 3 = 0
Using the expressions of the rents in  00; (IC5) is rewritten as rHH  rHL. Together
with the hypothesis that (IC3) is binding, this involves that it is necessary to have
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qHH  qHL.





. Assuming that this condition is satised, it implies that rHH > rHL.









+ 1 whenever 1 = 1 i.e., with
rHH > rLL; and to  <
1 

+ whenever 2 = 1 i.e., with rLL > rHH ; both inequalities
being satised by assumption of the proposition. At a later stage, we show that there






F.2 The conditions under which (IC3) implies (IC1)





)  ( + ) (qHL   qHH): (29)





)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qHL)] =  2

(1  ) (1  );
showing that (29) is satised if and only if S 0 () su¢ ciently convex. As (29) is the converse
of (15), it is satised by the assumption of the proposition.
F.3 Either 1 = 1 or 2 = 1
As from the expressions of the rents, 1 = 1 when rHH > rLL and 2 = 1 when
rLL > rHH . We calculate








 f + [+ (1  )2] g













 f   [+ (1  )2] g
(1  ) (1  )




 [+ (1  )2] + (1  ) (1  ) (1 + 1  2)
1   (1  ) :
This inequality holds true as the right-hand side is smaller than 1: Hence, the condition






)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qLL)] =  2

1 +
 [+ (1  )2]







The right-hand side being negative, rHH > rLL if and only if S 0 () is not very convex.
Moreover, for any given degree of convexity of S 0 () ; the bigger 2 the more relaxed the
condition rHH > rLL: This shows that rHH  rLL and 2 > 0 hold jointly if and only if
2 = 1 (with rHH = rLL for a single degree of convexity of S 0 ()). Therefore, the only
cases that are feasible at the solution to  00 are 1 = 1 and 2 = 1. The former arises
when S 0 () is not very convex and rHH > rLL: The latter arises when S 0 () is su¢ ciently
convex to have rLL  rHH :
F.4 Check incentive constraints in  
F.4.1 Case 1 = 1
(IC3) is binding and, as previously shown, implies (IC1). Hence, they are both sat-
ised. (IC2) is rewritten as rLH  rHH ; (IC4) as qLL + rHH  qHH + rHL;
(IC5) as rHH  rHL; (IC6) as qLH + rLH  qHH + rHL; (IC10) as qLH  qHH
and (IC12) as qLL + rHH  qHH + rLL.





)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0(qLH)] =  2






)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qHL)] =  2

(1  ) (1  ):
The right-hand side of the former equality is closer to zero than the right-hand side of





; rLH   rHH is increased faster than is qHH   qHL as S 0 ()
becomes more convex. This means that rLH  rHH holds as long as qHH  qHL: (IC2) is
thus satised.




and qLL > qHH so that qLL > qHH . Together with (IC5),
this involves that (IC4) is satised. Moreover, rHH > rHL (as previously proved) so that







  [1   (1  )]  + 
(1  ) (1  )
S 0(qLH)  S 0 (qHH) =  
[1   (1  )]  + 
(1  ) (1  ) ;




and qLH > qHH . Hence, (IC10) is satised. Lastly, because
qLL > qHH together with rHH > rLL; (IC12) is satised.
F.4.2 Case 2 = 1
As before, (IC1) and (IC3) are both satised. (IC2) becomes rLH  rLL; (IC4)qLL+
rHH  qHH+rHL; (IC5) rHH  rHL; (IC6)qLH+ (rLH   rHL)  qHH+
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 (rLL   rHH) ; (IC9) qHH + rLL  qHL + rHH ; (IC10) qLH + rHH 
qHH + rLL and (IC12) qLL + rHH  qHH + rLL:




together with qLL > qLH : Hence, rLH > rLL so that




and qLL > qHH so that qLL > qHH :





qHL > qHH ; we have rHH  rHL and (IC5) is satised.




and qLH > qHH so that qLH > qHH . Together with (IC2)
and (IC5), this involves that (IC6) is satised. Then, because qHH > qHL and rLL > rHH ;





)+( + ) (qLH qHH)+(qLL qLH)+(qLH qLL)  0:





) = S 0(qLH)  S 0 (qLL)
so that qLH  qLL with S 0 () convex. Jointly with (IC10), this involves that (IC12) holds.
G Proof of Corollary 3
We rst show that, under the assumption of the corollary that the condition of the
kind 

< Y is violated in any of the previous propositions and corollaries, the solution
to   must satisfy qHH = qHL and rHH = rHL. We then state the reduced problem  000
that incorporates these conditions and nd its solution. We lastly show that this solution
satises the incentive constraints in  :
G.1 Show that qHH = qHL and rHH = rHL whenever   Y
Recall that (IC1) is binding and that it implies (IC3) if and only if S 0 () is not very
convex and 

satises some condition of the kind 

< Y (Proposition 1 and 2 as well




and the condition 

< Y
means that qHL > qHH ; which is necessary for having (IC1) binding and (IC3) implied
by (IC1). Recall also that (IC3) is binding and that it implies (IC1) if and only if S 0 () is
su¢ ciently convex and 

satises again some condition of the kind 

< Y (Proposition
3). When this is the case, qHL > qHH and the condition







which is necessary for having (IC3) binding and (IC1) implied by (IC3). Therefore, when
the condition of the kind 

< Y is not satised in any of the previous propositions and




and qHL = qHH ; with (IC1) and
(IC3) both binding. Equivalently, qHH = qHL together with rHH = rHL:
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G.2 The relaxed problem  000




LH = max fqHH + rHH ; qHH + rLLg :
Let us reformulate the latter rent as
LH = 1 (qHH + rHH) + 2 (qHH + rLL) ;
with 1 + 2 = 1; 1 = 1 if and only if rHH > rLL; 2 = 1 if and only if rLL > rHH and
both 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 if and only if rLL = rHH : The agents expected rent is written
qHH + (1   + 1) (1  ) rHH +  (1  ) 2rLL:
At the solution to  000; the type LH quantities are set at the FB levels. Moreover,
S 0(q
LL











) = H   H + 
(1  ) (1  ) +
1   (1  1)
1   
S 0 (qHH) = H + H +

(1  ) (1  )  
1   (1  1)
1   




together with qHL = qHH for type HL.
G.3 The case of 1 = 1
Assume that 1 = 1 and so rHH > rLL. (IC2) is rewritten rLH  rHH ; (IC4) as
qLL > qHH ; (IC5) as rHH  rHL; (IC6) as qLH +rLH  qHH +rHH ; (IC10) as
qLH  qHH and (IC12) as qLL + rHH  qHH + rLL: (IC2) and (IC10) imply
(IC6). (IC4) and rHH > rLL imply (IC12). (IC5) is satised with equality.






1   (1  )









S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qLH) =
1   (1  )
(1  ) (1  )  
1
1  











)]  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qLH)] =
2
1  ; (30)
which shows that rLH  rHH (i.e., (IC2) holds) at the solution to  000 if and only if S 0 ()
is not too concave.






1   (1  )








S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qLL) =
1   (1  )
(1  ) (1  )  

1  ;
which is positive and so qLL > qHH : Hence, qLL > qHH and so (IC4) is satised.








  [S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qLL)] = 2

1  ; (31)
which shows that rHH > rLL if and only if S 0 () is su¢ ciently concave.
G.3.1 When the solution to  000 violates incentive constraints in  
The only conditions that might not hold jointly in  000 are rHH > rLL and rLH  rHH
(the constraint (IC2)), both depending upon the shape of S 0 () : As proved above, the
condition rHH > rLL holds but the condition rLH  rHH does not when S 0 () is very
concave. In this case, the solution to   is such that (IC2) is binding, or, equivalently,
rLH = rHH . Moreover, by comparing (31) with (30) ; we notice that there exist some
intermediary degrees of concavity of S 0 () for which both rHH > rLL and rLH > rHH :
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G.4 The case of 2 > 0
Assume that 2 = 1 and so rLL > rHH : (IC2) is rewritten as rLH  rLL; (IC4) as
qLL  qHH ; (IC5) as rHH  rHL; (IC6) as qLH + rLH  qHH + rLL; (IC10) as
qLH + rHH  qHH + rLL and (IC12) as qLL + rHH  qHH + rLL:
The condition qLH  qHH is necessary for (IC10) to hold. Together with (IC2) imply
(IC6). Moreover, (IC5) is satised with equality by the assumption of  000.
















; qLL > qLH and so (IC2) is satised.
Check (IC4). We calculate
S 0 (qHH)  S 0 (qLL) =
1   (1  )










1   (1  )












(1  ) (1  )2
 [1   (1  )] : (32)
We show below that this condition is satised and so (IC4) holds.









(1  ) (1  )

 + 











and qLH > qHH : It follows that qLH > qHH : Together with the
assumption that rLL > rHH ; this implies that (IC10) is satised.
Check (IC12). This is equivalent to
( + ) (qLL   qHH)  (  ) (qHH   qLL):
Because qLL > qHH and qLL > qHH ; this condition holds true.
Check the condition rLL > rHH that we assumed satised. From the previous cal-
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culations of S 0(q
HH
)   S 0(q
LL














which shows that rLL > rHH if and only if S 0 () is su¢ ciently convex. Moreover, (32)
does hold because the case in which S 0 () is so convex that rLL > rHH ; is associated in
the corollary with the hypothesis that the condition 

< 1 + 1 

in Proposition 3 is not
satised.
Lastly, we found that rHH > rLL if and only if S 0 () is su¢ ciently concave, whereas
rLL > rHH if and only if S 0 () is su¢ ciently convex. Therefore, when S 0 () is almost
linear, it must be the case that rLL = rHH and 0 < 2 < 1. The incentive constraints in
  are veried as above.
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